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Abstract
Previous empirical studies aiming to verify the relationship between the current ac-
count (CA) and government expenditures have produced mixed results across regions
and countries. In this study, we investigate whether cyclicality affects this relationship,
based on a sample of 51 countries and using quarterly and annual data from 2002Q1
to 2018Q4. We use a structural panel vector autoregression model (Pedroni, 2013) to
analyze the relationship between the CA and aggregate and disaggregate government
expenditures for different groups of countries. Our findings indicate that a negative
impact on the CA due to aggregate government spending is only visible in counter-
cyclical economies, suggesting the importance of cyclicality in explaining the dynamics
of the present value model. However, cyclicality is not sufficient for explaining the link
between disaggregate fiscal policy and the CA, due to substantial heterogeneity. A time-
series approach shows that subsidies play a significant role in the CA of Austria, Croatia,
Spain, and Bolivia and that property income is a major CA determinant in countries with
large external debts. Conversely, the largest components of public spending (compensa-
tion of employees, intermediate consumption, and social benefits) play a minor role.
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1 Introduction
Among the issues related to the decreasing fiscal space in many economies, the expected
effect on the current account (CA) balance is one of the most ambiguous and difficult to un-
derstand in macroeconomic analysis . On the one hand, the theoretical literature suggests that
fiscal deficits are accompanied by CA deficits if the relationship between private savings and
investment is constant. On the other hand, large budget deficits reduce the ability to borrow
in international markets and, thereby, running CA deficits to ensure consumption-smoothing
during economic downturns is less feasible. Understanding the relationship between fiscal
policy and the CA is important since many countries have suffered from both fiscal and CA
deficits simultaneously, and have highly prioritized improving these deficits by formulating
appropriate economic policies.
The main focus of this study is the interaction between government spending and the CA
in 51 countries. Using the intertemporal model of the CA as a theoretical basis, our empirical
analysis includes a correlation coefficient analysis, the Pedroni (2013) structural panel vector
autoregression (VAR) model, and a time-series Bayesian VAR analysis. Although previous
studies have attempted to uncover the relationship between the CA and fiscal policy, the
main novelty of our approach lies in two features: (1) the use of quarterly disaggregate
fiscal data instead of aggregate fiscal variables, while accounting for fiscal cyclicality, and
(2) the adoption of a fully structural VAR that decomposes impulse responses into common
and idiosyncratic components, while accounting for the underlying heterogeneity within our
sample.
Our findings indicate that the ability of fiscal policy to affect the CA depends on its re-
lationship with the business cycle, as the expected negative impact of aggregate government
spending only appears in countercyclical economies. However, accounting for cyclicality is
not sufficient for explaining the dynamics between disaggregate fiscal data and the CA. This
results from a substantial heterogeneity within our different subsamples, reflected in quartile
impulse responses and the decomposition into idiosyncratic and common shocks. We de-
2
rive the main trends by country from a time-series Bayesian VAR approach, based on two
different prior specifications (an independent normal-Wishart and a Litterman-Minnesota ap-
proach), using variance decomposition and orthogonalized impulse response functions. We
find that subsidies play a significant role in the CAs of Austria, Croatia, Spain, and Bolivia.
Property income is a major determinant of the CA in countries with high levels of external
debt, such as Italy, Spain, and Armenia. Although compensation of employees, intermedi-
ate consumption, and social benefits are the largest components of public spending in most
countries in our sample, they do not strongly contribute to the determination of the CA.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, a literature review
on the relationship between the CA and fiscal policy is provided. In Section 3, we describe
the dataset and methodology. The main stylized facts and a preliminary correlation analysis
are provided in Sections 4 and 5, respectively . Section 6 presents the main findings of the
empirical study based on the Structural panel and time-series VAR analyses. Finally, the last
section summarizes the main points of the paper.
2 Literature review
There are numerous literatures and theories on CA determination. Traditionally, it has been
assumed that the CA moves in the same direction as the fiscal balance (as in the twin deficits
hypothesis1 or the Mundell-Fleming framework2). However, the link between the CA and
both taxes and government expenditures is not considered to be equivalently strong. The
Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis (Barro, 1974) implies that there is no relationship be-
tween a CA deficit and Taxes because tax changes have no impact on private consumption.3
1Formally, the relationship between the CA and the fiscal balance is clear based on the identity Sp −
I + FB = CA, derived from national income identities, where Sp represents private savings, I national
investment, and FB is the fiscal balance, with FB = T − G = Sg (which is government savings). G is
government expenditures on goods and services and T is tax revenues.
2This model shows that a budget deficit leads to a CA deficit through an increase in interest rates, in addition
to other transmission channels that depend on the exchange rate regime and the nature of capital mobility (these
channels include the exchange rate, money supply, and private investment).
3A cut in taxes increases current wealth but this increase is used in extra savings as individuals will expect
future tax increases. On the other hand, private consumption affects the CA, as shown by Eq. 2.
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Conversely, the relationship between the CA and government expenditures is assumed to be
strong and negative, as implied by the intertemporal model of the CA, based on the following
expression:
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where At is the economy’s stock of net foreign claims at the end of period (t − 1), Yt
is the net domestic product, Gt is government consumption, and It is net investment. The
letters with a tilde represent the permanent level of the variables and (β̃/R)σ is the weighted







, where the market discount rate for consumption at time s is Rt,s =
1∏s
v=t+1(1+rv)
. This model, provided by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), constitutes the prevalent
theoretical framework for studying the dynamics of the CA. It is derived from two elements:
the national income identity and the permanent income hypothesis. According to the lat-
ter, the permanent level of consumption is determined by the permanent levels of the net
domestic product, investment, and government expenditures.4
Empirically, the link between fiscal policy and the CA has been analyzed in different
strands of the literature. The first strand focuses on the relationship between fiscal and CA
balances (see Appendix I). The lack of consensus in this literature results from underlying
structural forces in the sample countries that may lead to different correlations and also to
the different methodologies used (Litsios and Pilbeam, 2017). The second strand of the
literature attempts to uncover the main determinants of the CA from a set of variables (e.g.,
chosen from the literature on the determinants of savings and investment), which includes the
4The last term of the equation reflects consumption tilting due to differences between world interest rates
and the domestic rate of time preference (1− β) /β. When the home country is, on average, more impatient
than the rest of the world, ˜(β\R)σ < 1 as β is lower than future world interest rates, inducing a tendency
toward CA deficits, increasing foreign debt and reducing consumption. If, on the other hand, the rest of the
world is more impatient, consumption’s time path will have an upward tilt. The tilting effect is stronger when
σ (expressing intertemporal substitution in consumption) increases (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995).
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fiscal balance. For instance, Chinn and Prasad (2003) attempted to study the medium-term
determinants of the CA for a large sample of economies over the period 1971–1995. They
confirmed a positive relation between the CA, fiscal balances, and net foreign assets. Finally,
the third strand of the literature uses the intertemporal model for the CA as a theoretical
background. In that case, the permanent level of consumption can be expressed as




(1 + r)−iEt {Yt+i − It+i −Gt+i} ,
where Yt, It, Gt and Bt denote the output, investment, government spending, and net domes-
tic ownership of foreign assets, respectively. The non-stochastic world real interest rate r is
assumed to be positive. Using the total income identity leads to the following expression for









where the net outputNOt is given byNOt = Yt−It−Gt and ∆NOt+i = NOt+i−NOt+i−1.
The commonly used approach to verify this present value model (PVM) is the methodology
of Campbell (1987) and Campbell and Shiller (1987), which rests on the assumption that the
CA and the first difference of net output are unrestricted bivariate VAR processes.
Some authors succeeded in verifying this intertemporal model through empirical data
(Campa and Gavilan, 2011; Hoffmann, 2013). However, more frequently, empirical studies
based on the PVM model led to the rejection of the model (Ghosh, 1995; Milbourne and
Otto, 1992; Otto, 1992; Sheffrin and Woo, 1990). Usually, the modeled CA exhibits less
volatility than the actual data. To solve this issue, Nason and Rogers (2006) attempted to
verify whether the fit of the model could be improved if “the usual suspects”6 causing the
5The national income identity can be expressed as
Yt = It + Gt + NXt+rBt + r(1 + r)
−1∑∞
i=0 (1 + r)
−i
Et {Yt+i − It+i −Gt+i}, where the net exports
NXt are the difference between the CA and income from net foreign assets: NXt = CAt − rBt.
6Namely, non-separable preferences, fiscal policy, real interest rate shocks, external imperfect international
capital mobility, and internalized risk premium
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empirical rejection of the PVM were taken into account. They concluded that the failure of
basic PVM in explaining CA variation resulted from the absence of exogenous shocks on the
world real interest rate.
The intertemporal model (Eq. 1) shows that the interaction between the CA and govern-
ment expenditures involves other key variables, namely the de-trended net domestic product,
national investment, and the interest rate. Consequently, the expected negative relationship
between government spending and the CA may be altered by the diverging effects of these
other variables. In the case of net domestic product, if we assume that the CA is positively
correlated with the business cycle, then the link between the CA and government expendi-
tures would be negative only if fiscal policy is assumed to be countercyclical. According to
Kaminsky et al. (2004), the CA would be procyclical in the standard model, since borrowing
from abroad should be countercyclical to ensure consumption-smoothing.7 They provided
the following explanations to a counter-cyclical CA: a procyclical investment that domi-
nates the savings effect, distortions in consumption induced by temporary policies leading
to countercyclical savings (since consumption increases in prosperous times), and residents’
dissaving as capital inflows increase in prosperous times.
On the other hand, expectations regarding fiscal cyclicality in the literature vary based on
the theoretical framework. The traditional Keynesian view is based on the idea that public
expenditures should move in a countercyclical fashion and act as a catalyst for aggregate
demand in times of recession. In contrast, the neoclassical framework precludes any coun-
tercyclical role for fiscal policy and often considers that government expenditures follow an
exogenously given process (see Lucas and Stokey, 1983).8
Empirical studies on fiscal cyclicality have led to mixed results. The most common find-
ings indicate that policy tends to be less countercyclical than what the theory suggests. More
specifically, several empirical studies have found that as opposed to industrial economies,
7Changes in the CA can be explained by the capital account if the impact of international reserves is ignored
8Lane (2003) noted that, in the neoclassical framework, government consumption would be expected to
be countercyclical if public and private consumption were substitutes in utility, and procyclical if they were
complements.
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fiscal policy in developing countries is procyclical (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Talvi and Vegh,
2005; Braun, 2001; Lane, 2003; Thornton, 2008). The evidence for OECD countries is
mixed, but most studies reported acyclical or slightly countercyclical fiscal policy (Lane,
2003; Wyplosz, 2002).
In this study, we investigate the relationship between government spending and the CA
for a sample of countries while accounting for fiscal cyclicality. Fiscal cyclicality is mea-
sured using government spending in domestic currency in line with Kaminsky et al. (2004).
They argued that the concept of fiscal policy cyclicality should be defined based on policy
instruments, that is, government consumption and tax rates,9 as opposed to endogenously
determined outcomes (the fiscal balance or tax revenues). Further, they demonstrated how
the use of any variable expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), or the
fiscal balance or tax revenues could be misleading.
3 Data and Methodology
We use data in domestic currencies for a sample of 51 high- and middle-income countries.
We describe the data in Appendix II. The data are used on a per capita basis, in real terms or
deflated through a GDP deflator. Variables are de-trended using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP)
filter. After a general examination of the HP-de-trended data for the period 1995Q1–2019Q2,
from which we draw the main stylized facts, we introduce disaggregate fiscal data into the
analysis.
Disaggregate data of government expenditures are from the Government Finance Statis-
tics database of Eurostat and the IMF. The Eurostat database is based on the ESA 2010
accounting standards. Government expenditures are defined as the sum of 12 ESA cate-
gories10 (see the definitions provided in Appendix III). Data are available for the 28 Euro-
pean Union (EU) countries, starting from 2002. The values match those of the Government
9Data on tax rates are more difficult to obtain.
10ESA 2010 Manual, p. 274.
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Finance Statistics of the IMF (except that the latter excludes the categories of tax expenses
and transfers). We deflate the series using a price deflator calculated from nominal and real
government consumption expenditures and divide by population size. For non-EU countries,
we use data extracted from the IMF Government Finance Statistics database. Our subsam-
ple consists of 23 non-EU countries (i.e., 6 countries are excluded from our initial sample).
Additional adjustments to the data are reported in Appendix II.
Since the period of data availability is not the same for all countries, the sample period is
set to 2002Q1–2018Q4. In a first step, we use a correlation analysis to study the relationship
between cyclical components of disaggregate fiscal data and both the CA and GDP. Then,













+β4 (rit − r̃it)+εit,
(3)
whereNFAit represents the net financial assets of country i,Git is government consump-
tion, Iit is net investment, and rit is the short-term interest rate. The variables are expressed
as a percentage of GDP. We apply Pedroni’s (2013) structural heterogeneous panel VAR ap-
proach using Goes’s (2016) algorithm to study the impact of changes in government spending
on the CA, for groups based on fiscal cyclicality measures (terciles). The unique feature of
this approach is that it decomposes the different responses into responses to idiosyncratic
and common shocks. In a subsequent step, we complete our study by a time-series analysis
based on a Bayesian VAR approach (more details are provided in Appendix IV).
We briefly summarize Pedroni’s (2013) approach. Consider a panel composed of i =
1, . . . , N individual members, each of which consists of anM×1 vector of observed endoge-
nous variables yit. The data are assumed to be observed over T time periods (t = 1, ..., T )
for each member and used after de-meaning, where the M × 1 vector of de-meaned data is
zit = yit − ȳi. Structural composite white noise shocks εit may be cross-sectionally depen-
dent as expressed by the relation εit = Λiε̄t + ε̃it, where ε̄t and ε̃it represent common white
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noise shocks shared by all members and member-specific idiosyncratic white noise shocks,
respectively, and Λi is an M ×M diagonal matrix with the loading coefficients. The two
types of shocks are assumed to be orthogonal to each other. The moving average representa-
tion of the model is as follows: Ri (L) ∆zit = µit, where Ri (L) = I −
∑Pi
j=1RijL
j , with Pi
the lag truncation value, which can differ from one cross section to the other. The associated
structural form model is ∆zit = Ai (L) εit or Bi (L) ∆zit = εit, where Bi (L) = Ai(L)
−1.
Short-run restrictions can be imposed on the Bi (0) matrix. In the special case of recursive
restrictions, this is equivalent to the Cholesky orthogonalization.
In our data analysis, the identification strategy is based on a scenario of an exogenous
fiscal policy and an endogenous CA balance. Thereby, in the Cholesky ordering, government
expenditures are placed first and the CA last. The ordering for the disaggregate variables is
based on Granger causality tests. The first step of the methodology is to estimate the reduced-
form VAR through ordinary least squares (OLS) . Initially, the model is estimated separately
for each cross section. Then, to capture the common dynamics, theM×1 vector of common
time effects ∆z̄t = N−1t
∑Nt
i=1 ∆zit is calculated and the corresponding reduced-form VAR
model R̄ (L) ∆z̄t = µ̄t is estimated. Then, the appropriate identifying restrictions are used
to obtain the structural shock estimates εit = Bi (L)Ri(L)
−1µit and ε̄t = B̄ (L) R̄(L)
−1µ̄t.
Moreover, to obtain the elements of the loadings matrix Λi, N×M OLS regressions of εit on
ε̄t are run, based on the relation εit = Λiε̄t + ε̃it. At this stage, we report the median impulse
responses for our subsamples along with bootstrap confidence intervals from 100 repetitions.
We then report the quartile impulse responses and analyze the decomposition of re-
sponses between those to common and those to idiosyncratic shocks. The composite im-
pulse response functions calculated from the individual structural VAR estimation can be
decomposed into common and idiosyncratic shocks as follows: First, a re-scaling of the re-
sponses to idiosyncratic shocks is required, based on the following argument: The variances
for the structural shocks can be expressed as E [εitε′it] = E
[




i + Ωi,ε̃. By setting Ωi,ε̄ = Ωi,ε = I , we obtain Ωi,ε̃ = I − ΛiΛi′. This
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implies that responses to common shocks for unity-sized shocks would correspond to re-
sponses to idiosyncratic shocks for shocks of size 1 − Λ(m,m)2, where m = 1, ...,M .
To perform the re-scaling, we can rewrite the expression for composite structural shocks
as εit = Λiε̄t + (I − ΛiΛ′i)
1/2ε̃∗it. Finally, this re-scaled form can be used to decompose
the impulse responses such that Ai (L) εit = Ai (L)
(





the decomposition Ai (L) = Āi (L) + Ãi (L) where Āi (L) = Ai (L) Λi and Ãi (L) =
Ai (L) (I − ΛiΛ′i)
1
2 = Ai (L) − Āi (L). The sample distribution of estimated responses
can be used to describe the properties of the sample (with the median, and the 1st and 3rd
quartiles used as confidence intervals) or to create fitted values for member-specific impulse
responses.
4 Stylized facts
This section presents an overview of the main stylized facts discovered through a general
examination of the collected data. We split our sample in different ways, comparing OECD
with non-OECD countries, as well as different regional and income groups .
Stylized fact 1: The correlation between the CA and aggregate government consump-
tion expenditure is weak and differs across countries and time periods.
The correlation coefficients between the CA and general government expenditures (Ta-
ble 1) are small in most cases. By region, the correlation coefficients between the CA
and general government expenditures is negative or close to zero in almost all cases
(except in North America—specifically, in the United States).
Stylized fact 2: Generally, the fiscal policy of OECD countries is either countercycli-
cal or acyclical. Conversely, in developing countries, it is procyclical in most cases.
In line with the results of previous empirical studies, we find that the fiscal policy in
OECD countries is, in most cases, either acyclical or countercyclical whereas in devel-
oping economies, and particularly Latin American countries, it is procyclical (Table
10
1).
Stylized fact 3: The CA tends to behave acyclically or countercyclically.
As opposed to our expectations, for most groups in our sample, the CA does not appear
to be procyclical during the studied period. Countries with the most procyclical CA
include Croatia (0.77), Canada (0.56), Norway, Sweden, and Singapore (correlation
close to 0.29) . According to the permanent income hypothesis, there will be a deficit
in the CA if consumers expect a future increase in income. Therefore, we can consider
that the data behave in line with the theory only if we suppose that a positive evolution
of GDP in the short run leads to positive expectations about future income.
5 Correlation analysis of disaggregate fiscal data
In this section, we examine the correlation of disaggregate government expenditures data
with the CA and GDP. Using disaggregate fiscal data, we first calculate the share of each
component in the overall government expenditures (Table 2). We note that the most signif-
icant components are “Compensation of employees,” “Social benefits,” and “Intermediate
consumption of goods and services,” with a total share of 75% in all expenditures. We
also note that the shares for “Compensation for employees” and, especially, “Intermediate
consumption of goods and services” are relatively larger for non-OECD/ middle-income
economies compared to OECD/high-income economies. The opposite is true for social ben-
efits. Examining the fiscal cyclicality measures for these categories (Tables 3 and 4), we
note that the procyclicality of non-OECD/middle-income is more notable in “Compensation
of employees” and “Intermediate consumption.” Overall, the relationship between the cycli-
cal components of the CA and disaggregate expenditures is weak in both income and OECD
groups .
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6 The CA model: A heterogeneous panel VAR analysis
6.1 Structural VAR analysis: Median impulse responses
We use Pedroni’s (2013) structural panel VAR approach to analyze the relationship between
the CA and disaggregate government expenditures in different groups of countries. This
approach controls for country fixed effects and allows for full heterogeneity of dynamics
across countries, as opposed to the standard panel VAR approaches based on average es-
timates. The estimation is performed after the decomposition of shocks into idiosyncratic
and common components. Our identification strategy is based on a scenario of exogenous
fiscal policy and an endogenous CA. Thereby, in the ordering of the variables, government
expenditures are placed first and the CA last.
The median composite response of the CA to one-unit composite shocks in other vari-
ables is shown in Figure 1, with confidence intervals based on 100 bootstrap repetitions. This
preliminary result shows that the relationship between the CA and total government expen-
ditures is not substantially significant. On the other hand, the CA responds positively and
significantly to a change of a relatively strong magnitude in net foreign assets and negatively
to a change in gross fixed capital formation.
To check whether fiscal cyclicality affects the relationship between the CA and fiscal
policy, we divide the sample into terciles based on the measure of fiscal cyclicality, that is,
the correlation between cyclical components of GDP and government expenditures (as in
Table 1). The aim is to separate the sample into countercyclical, acyclical, and procyclical
countries. We obtain the following groups:
Group 1: countercyclical countries, corresponding to the 1st tercile group in terms of
measures of fiscal cyclicality (correlation with GDP < -0.09)
Group 2: countries in the 2nd tercile group, with a fiscal cyclicality measure between
-0.09 and 0.05
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Group 3: group of procyclical countries (3rd tercile group) with a fiscal cyclicality
measure > 0.05
The median composite impulse response function for Group 1 (Figure 2) shows a nega-
tive and significant response of the CA to government expenditures in the first period, fol-
lowed by a positive response in the second period. The opposite is observed for Group 2,
where a positive response to government expenditures in the first period is followed by a
negative response in the second period. For Group 3, the resulting response is only weakly
significant. These results clearly indicate that the ability of fiscal policy to affect the CA de-
pends on its interaction with the business cycle. Provided that the CA is positively affected
by the business cycle, then a negative relationship between government spending and the CA
would only be visible in countercyclical economies. In other cases, the relationship would
be less predictable, as confirmed by the impulse responses. Finally, in the procyclical group,
we note that the relationship between the CA and net foreign assets is the most robust one
whereas the negative response to gross fixed capital formation is not significant .11
6.2 Quartile impulse response functions
Next, we analyze the properties of the individual composite responses’ distribution by plot-
ting their median, average, and the 1st and 3rd quartiles as confidence intervals. Since this
approach shows the response of most of the sample, it is more informative than the median
with bootstrap confidence intervals or the traditional averaging methods used for panels.
For countercyclical economies (Figure 3), we observe a negative response to total gov-
ernment spending in the first period.12 However, in the second period, the response becomes
positive in 9 out of 17 countries. Although the impact of government expenditures on shocks
to other variables does explain part of this sign change, the main reason for it appears to be
a direct lagged positive effect from total government spending to the CA. We then replace
11Responses to net foreign assets, gross fixed capital formation and the interest rate are not reported in the
remaining part of the study because they are similar to those in Figures 1 and 2.
12Except for 2 countries: Chile and Latvia.
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total government expenditures in the model by disaggregate fiscal data.13
Responses to disaggregate government spending (Figure 4a) are much less significant
due to larger standard errors. Such a heterogeneous response would not have been visible
if we had relied solely on the average or median responses. In acyclical economies, the
response to total government spending is positive in most of the sample in the first period
and becomes negative immediately after that (Figure 3). None of the government spending
components induces a homogeneous response in this group, except for a positive contem-
poraneous response to social benefits (Figure 4b). In procyclical economies, responses to
total government spending are not very significant as the median lies close to zero (Figure
3). The CA responds negatively to social benefits in the first period but all other responses
are disparate (Figure 4c).
6.3 Decomposition into idiosyncratic and common shocks
The heterogeneity noted in the quartile impulse response functions is confirmed by the de-
composition of composite shocks into idiosyncratic and common shocks. Figure 5 reveals
that most composite responses are characterized as idiosyncratic rather than common shocks.
Further, responses to common shocks are opposite in direction to responses to idiosyncratic
shocks in some cases. This is because the groups contain countries that do not respond in a
similar way to global shocks.14 For instance, the 2007 financial crisis led to a deterioration of
the fundamentals of some countries (a negative shock, especially in 2008Q4), but countries
that have been able to weather the crisis do not exhibit a significant change in the variables
(the changes in the error terms are small ). Consequently, in the latter group of countries,
common shocks and composite shocks are negatively related. Another possible cause of this
negative correlation could be an opposite feedback effect from variables affected by the crisis
13As it is difficult to order disaggregate expenditures based on economic logic, we use Granger causality tests
as a reference. The following ordering of the variables is obtained: property income, subsidies, compensation
of employees, intermediate consumption, social benefits, other expenditures, interest rate, net foreign assets,
gross fixed capital formation, and the CA.
14While decomposing individual composite shocks, the term of the loading matrix corresponding to common
shocks is negative, implying a negative correlation between individual and common shocks.
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on government expenditures in some countries.
Figure 6 provides an example based on the decomposition of the median composite re-
sponse to property income in the fiscal cyclicality group 1.15 In this case, the reason common
and composite shocks are negatively correlated is that the average property income for the
countries in the group received a negative shock in 2008Q4, but at the individual level, many
countries were either not affected or received this fiscal shock on a different date in 2008 or
2009.16
7 A time-series analysis of the CA model
The heterogeneity of responses to disaggregate government spending shocks suggests the
absence of a strong and robust relationship between a particular component and the CA. As
it is difficult to find a homogeneous response of the CA to disaggregate fiscal data among
the different fiscal cyclicality groups, we run a time-series analysis for each country. We use
a Bayesian VAR model (see Appendix IV) based on an independent normal-Wishart prior
with Gibbs sampling to derive the orthogonalized impulse response functions and report the
main responses with 95% confidence bands as well as a variance decomposition of the CA
by country (Table 5). The choice of this method is justified by the need to account for the
uncertainties related to the determination of model and parameter values. As a robustness
check, we also estimate the same model with a different prior specification based on the
Litterman-Minnesota approach (Table 6). In a few countries (e.g., Hong Kong and Singa-
15In Figure 6, we separate group 1 into two subgroups: subgroup (a), with countries for which responses to
common shocks and those to composite shocks have opposite signs; and subgroup (b), in which both responses
have the same direction. We find that, at the time of the crisis, the interest rate is the main driving factor behind
property income shocks in almost all countries. In most countries in the group, this variable was negatively
affected in 2018Q4, as a result of governments’ intervention at the time. However, while in countries of
subgroup (a) the resulting structural shock to property income is positive due to a negative effect from interest
rates, in subgroup (b), the resulting structural shock is negative.
16We express the structural shock to the variable s at time t as εst = βs−1µt, where µt is a vector of reduced-
form shocks at t and βs a vector of contemporaneous effects on s from the Cholesky factor. The main element
in µt in the example is the interest rate (in 2018Q4) with a significant negative shock. However, in subgroup
(a), the corresponding factor in βs−1is also negative, leading to an overall positive structural shock, while in
subgroup (b), this term is positive
15
pore), the two approaches yield substantially different outcomes but for most of the sample,
the results are consistent.
The variance decomposition (values in the 8th quarter) clearly indicates that the relation-
ship between disaggregate government spending and the CA differs among countries. We
note that the share of subsidies is notably higher in two countercyclical economies: Austria
and Croatia. This could be the result of export subsidies. In the particular case of Croatia, the
government still plays a significant role in the economy, which results in overall high gov-
ernment expenditures (over 40% of the GDP in total). Interestingly, for this economy, the
impulse response functions show that subsidies have a negative impact on the CA. Subsidies
are also significant in the case of Bolivia. In this economy, hydrocarbons (especially natural
gas) account for approximately half of the total exports and are managed by state-owned en-
terprises. Although the natural gas sector was privatized in the 1990s, it was re-nationalized
in 2006.
We note the importance of property income (comprising payable income such as in-
terests and dividends) in high-income countries characterized by high net borrowing from
abroad, such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal, in which more than 30% of public debt is held
by non-resident investors. We note that in Spain, subsidies are also relatively significant in
explaining the CA variation. Among middle-income economies, the contribution of prop-
erty income to the CA variation is also notable in Armenia and Indonesia. Armenia exhibits
a CA deficit with an exports structure that relies essentially on minerals and precious and
non-precious metals, and top imports that include oil and natural gas. The country’s deficit
is financed by external borrowing and net foreign direct investment. Most of its external debt
was obtained through multi-country credit programs but there is also a significant share of
non-resident investments in government bonds. It is also worth mentioning that the coun-
try is known to have a large diaspora spread globally, resulting in the large and important
impact of remittances on the Armenian economy. The impulse response functions show a
positive response of the CA to a shock in property income for all these countries , with wide
16
confidence bands.
The three largest components of government expenditures (compensation of employees,
intermediate consumption, and social benefits), although representing a higher percentage
of total spending, play a less significant role in the determination of the CA. Exceptionally,
the share of government compensation of employees in the cases of Estonia and Slovenia is
higher than that of all other variables. We also notice that the overall value of compensation
of employees in the Estonian CA balance has significantly increased after 2004, which may
be an indication that joining the EU had an impact on the non-resident labor in the country.
The impulse response functions show a positive response of the CA in both Estonia and
Slovenia.
Unsurprisingly, net foreign assets strongly affect the CA of Luxembourg, Belgium, and
the United Kingdom. We can see that this component exhibits, on average, less weight
in middle-income economies, except in Turkey, which has emerged as a significant capital
investor abroad in recent decades. Gross fixed capital formation generally plays a small role
in CA determination, with the exception of Ireland, the Netherlands, and, to a much lesser
extent, Lithuania, Belarus and Croatia. Finally, in both estimated models, the highest level
of CA persistence is noted in the cases of France and Colombia.
8 Concluding remarks
Using various statistical methods, we have investigated the relationship between the CA and
government expenditures. Our findings confirm previously reported difficulties in obtaining
strong empirical evidence in favor of the PVM for a panel of advanced and developing coun-
tries. Further, our findings explain why previous studies often showed mixed results about
this relationship.
First, to explain the underlying heterogeneity in our sample, we account for fiscal cycli-
cality. As reported in previous empirical studies, the cyclicality analysis shows that fiscal
policy tends to be procyclical in middle-income economies and acyclical in high-income
17
economies. This procyclicality most notably emerges in two categories of public spending:
“Compensation of employees” and “Intermediate consumption.” Our findings confirm that
cyclicality does affect the relationship between aggregate government expenditures and the
CA since the expected negative impact of a fiscal shock appears only in the countercycli-
cal group. Still, cyclicality is not sufficient for explaining the link between disaggregate
fiscal policy and the CA, due to substantial heterogeneity, even within groups with similar
cyclicality measures.
Second, we use a time-series approach and uncover the main public expenditures contrib-
utors to CA determination through a variance decomposition analysis. We find that subsidies
play a significant role in Austria, Croatia, Spain, and Bolivia. In contrast, property income
is the most significant contributor in countries with high levels of external debt such as Italy,
Spain, and Armenia. However, the main components of aggregate public spending (compen-
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Correlation coefficient between detrended current account and fiscal variables and
cyclicality of the current account and government expenditures by group of countries
Correlation of the Current Account with Cyclicality Measures
Government Expenditures Fiscal Balance Current Account Government Expenditures
All -0.07 0.00 -0.13 0.08
OECD -0.04 -0.03 -0.09 0.04
non-OECD -0.11 0.04 -0.18 0.14
Income groups
High Income -0.06 -0.01 -0.12 0.07
Middle-Income -0.10 0.02 -0.14 0.12
Regions
East Asia 0.00 -0.05 -0.13 0.01
Eastern Europe -0.16 0.09 -0.22 0.09
Latin America -0.01 -0.02 -0.18 0.20
North America 0.24 0.01 -0.05 -0.27
Pacific -0.02 -0.09 -0.23 0.19
South-East Asia -0.18 0.05 -0.13 0.14
Southern Africa -0.16 -0.10 -0.19 0.28
West and Central Asia -0.01 0.08 -0.08 0.08
Western Europe -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 0.05
Notes: All variables are in real terms per capita, detrended using the Hodrick Prescott filter. The values in the table represent average
correlation coefficients over groups (calculated on a country by country basis). Cyclicality measures correspond to the correlation
coefficients with GDP.
TABLE 2
Breakdown of government expenses by category
Government Expenses categories All subsample Income group OECD groupHigh Income Middle income non-OECD OECD
Compensation of employees 27% 27% 29% 30% 26%
Intermediate consumption 19% 17% 23% 24% 15%
Interest expenses 6% 5% 8% 6% 7%
Subsidies 4% 4% 5% 5% 4%
Social benefits 34% 38% 25% 27% 40%
Other expenses 10% 9% 10% 10% 9%
Notes: The share of each component is calculated based on the average values per country (based on variables in real terms per
capita). The obtained shares per country are then averaged over groups of countries. For EU countries, data for government expenses
are extracted from the Government Finance Statistics database of Eurostat (based on ESA 2010 standards). For non EU countries,
data are extracted from the Government Finance Statistics database of International Financial Statistics (IMF). Highlighted values
correspond to shares above 10%.
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TABLE 3
Cyclicality measures, correlation of government expenses categories with the current
account
Government expenses All Income group OECD groupHigh Income Middle income non-OECD OECD
Correlation with GDP
Compensation of employees 0.17 0.02 0.51 0.38 0.03
Intermediate consumption 0.15 0.03 0.41 0.34 0.02
Interest expenses 0.12 0.05 0.27 0.15 0.09
Subsidies 0.02 -0.08 0.27 0.19 -0.09
Social Benefits 0.00 -0.16 0.34 0.18 -0.13
Other expenses -0.01 -0.07 0.12 0.03 -0.04
Correlation with the Current Account
Compensation of employees 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.05
Intermediate consumption -0.03 -0.01 -0.09 -0.06 -0.01
Interest expenses 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03
Subsidies 0.00 0.02 -0.05 -0.10 0.07
Social Benefits 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.06
Other expenses -0.05 -0.02 -0.10 -0.08 -0.02
Notes: the values in the table represent average correlation coefficients (calculated on a country by country basis). The underlying
data correspond to cyclical components of the variables per capita, in real terms.
TABLE 4












East Asia 0.04 0.11 -0.03 0.07 0.003 -0.12
Eastern Europe 0.08 -0.18 0.15 -0.05 0.21 -0.12
Latin America 0.04 0.10 0.03 -0.01 0.07 -0.04
North America 0.06 0.09 0.15 -0.04 -0.01 0.24
Pacific -0.02 -0.13 -0.28 0.07 -0.09 -0.04
South-East Asia 0.07 0.06 -0.17 -0.26 -0.02 -0.03
Southern Africa 0.24 -0.09 -0.12 -0.17 -0.17 -0.35
West and Central Asia 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.08
Western Europe 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.02 -0.01
Total 0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.07 -0.05
Notes: the values in the table represent average correlation coefficients (calculated on a country by country basis). The underlying
data correspond to cyclical components of the variables per capita, in real terms.
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TABLE 5
Variance decomposition of the CA by country after 8 quarters (Independent
Normal-Wishart prior)
a. Group 1 (countercyclical)
Countries pi sub comp ic sb oth rate nfa gfcf ca
High-Income
Austria 0.03 0.33 0.14 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.06 0.11
Belgium 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.45 0.03 0.15
Canada 0.08 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.26
Chile 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.23 0.09 0.03 0.30
Croatia 0.05 0.52 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.13 0.10
Denmark 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.24 0.08 0.15
Finland 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.17 0.02 0.26
France 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.51
Germany 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.26
Japan 0.15 0.39 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.23
Latvia 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.29
Luxembourg 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.39 0.03 0.22
Slovakia 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.43
South Korea 0.15 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.16 0.09 0.02 0.26
Sweden 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.36 0.02 0.22
Switzerland 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.23 0.03 0.26
United States 0.08 0.51 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.08
Average 0.08 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.04 0.24
Standard Deviation 0.04 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.11
b. Group 2 (acyclical)
Countries pi sub comp ic sb oth rate nfa gfcf ca
High-Income
Czech Republic 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.29 0.02 0.11
Estonia 0.08 0.14 0.26 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.19
Greece 0.17 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.37
Hong Kong 0.33 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.30
Italy 0.36 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.18
Lithuania 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.20 0.25
Netherlands 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.22 0.31 0.11
New Zealand 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.20 0.24 0.04 0.16
Portugal 0.25 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.20
Singapore 0.45 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.23
Slovenia 0.11 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.16 0.07 0.27
Spain 0.16 0.26 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.14 0.08
United Kingdom 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.08 0.04 0.30 0.02 0.20
Average 0.18 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.20
Standard Deviation 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.08
Middle-Income
Bulgaria 0.13 0.19 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.15
Colombia 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.49
Indonesia 0.19 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.29
Romania 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.17 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.28
Thailand 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.06 0.36
Average 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.31
Standard Deviation 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.11
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c. Group 3 (procyclical)
Countries pi sub comp ic sb oth rate nfa gfcf ca
High-Income
Australia 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.19 0.03 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.28
Hungary 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.69
Iceland 0.10 0.20 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.18 0.12 0.08
Ireland 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.65 0.06
Norway 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.38
Average 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.30
Standard Deviation 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.24 0.23
Middle-Income
Armenia 0.22 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.19 0.10 0.17
Belarus 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.24 0.19
Bolivia 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.49
Brazil 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.20 0.09 0.17 0.15
Georgia 0.19 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.05 0.31
Kazakhstan 0.13 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.02 0.38
Mexico 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.25 0.02 0.27
Moldova 0.10 0.06 0.19 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.17 0.02 0.32
Peru 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.16 0.38
South Africa 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.35
Turkey 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.15 0.11 0.23
Average 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.30
Standard Deviation 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.10
Notes: ca= current account balance, pi= property income , sub= subsidies, comp= compensation of employees, ic= intermediate
consumption, sb= social benefits, oth= other expenditures, rate= interest rate, nfa= net foreign assets, gfcf= gross fixed capital
formation. Data in domestic currency divided by GDP. Group 1 includes countries of the 1st tercile in terms of measures of fiscal
cyclicality defined as the correlation between cyclical components of GDP and government expenditures (corresponding to a fiscal
cyclicality ¡ -0.09). Group 2 is the group of countries of the 2nd tercile in terms of measures of fiscal cyclicality (fiscal cyclicality
measure between -0.09 and 0.05). Group 3 is the group of countries of the 3rd tercile in terms of measures of fiscal cyclicality (fiscal
cyclicality measure above 0.05). Values above 0.2 are highlighted. Cholesky ordering: pi, sub, comp, ic, sb, oth, rate, nfa, gfcf, ca
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TABLE 6
Variance decomposition of the CA by country after 8 quarters (Litterman-Minnesota prior)
a. Group 1 (countercyclical)
Countries pi sub comp ic sb oth rate nfa gfcf ca
High-Income
Austria 0.01 0.18 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.19 0.16 0.23
Belgium 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.44 0.03 0.32
Canada 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.78
Chile 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.69
Croatia 0.02 0.23 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.33
Denmark 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.08 0.33
Finland 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.58
France 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.90
Germany 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.61
Japan 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.74
Latvia 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.18 0.02 0.49
Luxembourg 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.49 0.03 0.36
Slovakia 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.61
South Korea 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.70
Sweden 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.56
Switzerland 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.01 0.65
United States 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.18 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.43
Average 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.55
Standard Deviation 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.18
b. Group 2 (acyclical)
Countries pi sub comp ic sb oth rate nfa gfcf ca
High-Income
Czech Republic 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.32 0.03 0.29
Estonia 0.00 0.09 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.47
Greece 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.69
Hong Kong 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.90
Italy 0.27 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.39
Lithuania 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.54
Netherlands 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.20 0.35 0.28
New Zealand 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.29 0.08 0.35
Portugal 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.38
Singapore 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.81
Slovenia 0.02 0.01 0.22 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.49
Spain 0.24 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.26
United Kingdom 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.34 0.00 0.51
Average 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.07 0.49
Standard Deviation 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.20
Middle-Income
Bulgaria 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.48
Colombia 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.87
Indonesia 0.15 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.66
Romania 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.66
Thailand 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.68
Average 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.67
Standard Deviation 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.12
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c. Group 3 (procyclical)
Countries pi sub comp ic sb oth rate nfa gfcf ca
High-Income
Australia 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.64
Hungary 0.15 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.61
Iceland 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.10 0.27
Ireland 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.72 0.20
Norway 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.59
Average 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.18 0.46
Standard Deviation 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.27 0.19
Middle-Income
Armenia 0.19 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.27 0.33
Belarus 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.18 0.49
Bolivia 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73
Brazil 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.52
Georgia 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.71
Kazakhstan 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.76
Mexico 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.04 0.74
Moldova 0.06 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.69
Peru 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.70
South Africa 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.82
Turkey 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.23 0.14 0.31
Average 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.62
Standard Deviation 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.17
Notes: ca= current account balance, pi= property income , sub= subsidies, comp= compensation of employees, ic= intermediate
consumption, sb= social benefits, oth= other expenditures, rate= interest rate, nfa= net foreign assets, gfcf= gross fixed capital
formation. Data in domestic currency divided by GDP. Group 1 is the sample’s 1st tercile in terms of measures of fiscal cyclicality
(¡ -0.09). Group 2 is the 2nd tercile (between -0.09 and 0.05). Group 3 is the 3rd tercile (above 0.05). Values greater than 0.2 are
highlighted. Cholesky ordering: pi, sub, comp, ic, sb, oth, rate, nfa, gfcf, ca
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Figures
FIGURE 1: Median response of the current account to one unit composite shocks for the
whole sample with bootstrap confidence intervals based on 100 repetitions (aggregate fiscal
data)
FIGURE 2: Median response of the current account to one unit composite shocks by fiscal
cyclicality groups with bootstrap confidence intervals based on 100 repetitions (aggregate
fiscal data)
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Notes: Group 1 is the group of countries of the 1st tercile in terms of measures of fiscal cyclicality defined as the correlation between
cyclical components of GDP and government expenditures (corresponding to a fiscal cyclicality < -0.09). Group 2 is the group of
countries of the 2nd tercile in terms of measures of fiscal cyclicality (fiscal cyclicality measure between -0.09 and 0.05). Group 3 is the
group of countries of the 3rd tercile in terms of measures of fiscal cyclicality (fiscal cyclicality measure above 0.05).
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FIGURE 3: Quartile impulse responses of the current account to a one-unit composite shock
to aggregate government expenditures (by fiscal cyclicality group)
FIGURE 4: Quartile impulse responses of the current account to a one-unit composite shock
to disaggregate government expenditures (by fiscal cyclicality group)
a. Group 1 (countercyclical)
Notes: CA= current account balance, PI= property income, SUB= subsidies, COMP= Compensation of employees, IC= intermediate
consumption, SB= social benefits, OTH= Other expenditures. Data in domestic currency divided by GDP. Group 1 contains countries of
the 1st tercile in terms of fiscal cyclicality (measure < -0.09). Group 2 is the second tercile (acyclical economies with measure between
-0.09 and 0.05) and Group 3 is the third tercile (procyclical economies with measure >0.05)
32
b. Group 2 (acyclical)
c. Group 3 (procyclical)
33
FIGURE 5: Decomposition of the median composite response of the current account to a
one-unit composite shock to disaggregate government expenditures between common and
idiosyncratic responses (by fiscal cyclicality group)
a. Group 1 (countercyclical)
b. Group 2 (acyclical)
34
c. Group 3 (procyclical)
Notes: CA= current account balance, PI= property income, SUB= subsidies, COMP= Compensation of employees, IC= intermediate
consumption, SB= social benefits, OTH= Other expenditures. Data in domestic currency divided by GDP. Group 1 is the group of
countries of the 1st tercile in terms of measures of fiscal cyclicality defined as the correlation between cyclical components of GDP and
government expenditures (< -0.09). Group 2 is the group of countries of the 2nd tercile (between -0.09 and 0.05). Group 3 is the the 3rd
tercile (fiscal cyclicality measure above 0.05).
FIGURE 6: Decomposition of the median composite response of the current account to a one
unit composite shock to property income expenditures between common and idiosyncratic
responses (by subgroups of group 1)
Notes: CA= ratio of current account balance/GDP, PI= property income/GDP. Group 1 contains countries of the 1st tercile in terms of
fiscal cyclicality (value < -0.09). Subgroup (b) includes the countries of Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg and Switzerland and




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix II: Data description
Data have been extracted from the following sources, in millions of domestic currency, used
in real terms and divided by the population (population data from the IFS)
Variable Data source Adjustment
Gross Domestic
Product
Data in real terms from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics
(IFS) database
Gaps completed using nominal
series and GDP deflator calcu-
lated from annual series, or using
growth rate of annual real series









Data in nominal terms from Datas-
tream (DS mnemonic = ”country
code” & CURBALA)
Deflated using calculated GDP de-
flator. For data only available in
US dollars, data for other variables
converted to US dollars based





Data in real terms from Datas-
tream (DS mnemonic: ”country
code” & XGCSA.D, if absent data
without seasonal adjustment taken




Data in current prices from
Datastream (”country code” &
GFCF.C), or from the IFS
Converted to real terms using a de-
flator calculated based on annual
nominal and real series from IFS
Private con-
sumption
Data in current prices from Datas-
tream (”country code” & CN-
PER.D), or from the IFS
Short-term inter-
est rates
Short-term interest rates from IFS
(IMF)
Gaps completed based on Short-
term interest rates from Datas-
tream (OECD: ”country code” &
OCFISTR, Oxford economics:
”country code” & XRCB..R)
or the Policy rate (Datastream:
”country code” & PRATE.) or the
Money Market rates (IFS)
38
Variable Data source Adjustment
Fiscal balance Data in current prices from Datas-
tream (”country code” & GOV-
BALA) or from the IFS








/database (access from website:
General and regional statis-
tics >>Economy and Finance
>>Government Statistics)
Deflator calculated from real
Government consumption ex-
penditures series and nominal
series extracted from IFS (when










Deflator calculated from real
Government consumption expen-
ditures series and nominal series
extracted from IFS, averaged
yearly (when unavailable, calcula-
tion is made from annual data)
Additional adjustments
For disaggregate fiscal data of non EU countries which were available on an annual basis, we estimated quar-
terly data using the tool of temporal disaggregation from JDemetra+ software17(provided by Eurostat). The
quarterly values were estimated using quarterly GDP as the higher frequency indicator series. The chosen ap-
proach was the Chow-Lin method (Chow and Lin,1971), based on an autoregressive model of order 1 for the
error vector. After those adjustments, the resulting dataset is a balanced panel of 51 countries over the period
2002Q1-2018Q4.
Appendix III: Description of government expenses categories
Government expenditure comprises the following ESA categories. These definitions have been taken from the
ESA 2010 manual (Chapters 3 and 4).
• P2 Intermediate consumption: intermediate consumption consists of goods and services consumed as
inputs by a process of production, excluding fixed assets whose consumption is recorded as consumption
of fixed capital. The goods and services are either transformed or used up by the production process.
• P5 Gross capital formation: includes in addition gross fixed capital formation, changes in inventories
and acquisitions less disposals of valuables
• D1 Compensation of employees: defined as the total remuneration, in cash or in kind, payable by an
employer to an employee in return for work done by the latter during an accounting period. It includes
wages and salaries in addition to social contributions such as pensions
17http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cros/content/download en (replacing old Ecotrim)
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• D29 Other taxes on production, payable: consist of all taxes that enterprises incur as a result of
engaging in production, independent of the quantity or value of the goods and services produced or
sold.
• D3 Subsidies, payable: current unrequited payments which general government or the institutions of
the European Union make to resident producers.
• D4 Property income, payable: property income (D.4) accrues when the owners of financial assets and
natural resources put them at the disposal of other institutional units. The income payable for the use
of financial assets is called investment income, while that payable for the use of a natural resource is
called rent. Property income is the sum of investment income and rent (e.g. interests and dividends).
• D5 Current taxes on incomes, wealth, etc.: “current taxes on income, wealth, etc.” (D.5) cover all
compulsory, unrequited payments, in cash or in kind, levied periodically by general government and by
the rest of the world on the income and wealth of institutional units, and some periodic taxes which are
assessed neither on that income nor that wealth.
• Social benefits: social benefits include the following:
– D62 Social benefits other than social transfers in kind: made up of:
– Social security benefits in cash: social security benefits in cash are social insurance benefits
payable in cash to households by social security funds. Reimbursements are excluded and treated
as social transfers in kind (D.632).
– Other social insurance benefits: other social insurance benefits correspond to benefits payable by
employers in the context of other employment related social insurance schemes. Other employment-
related social insurance benefits are social benefits (in cash or in kind) payable by social insurance
schemes other than social security to contributors to the schemes, their dependents or their sur-
vivors.
– Social assistance benefits in cash: social assistance benefits in cash are current transfers payable
to households by government units or NPISHs to meet the same needs as social insurance benefits
but which are not made under a social insurance scheme requiring participation usually by means
of social contributions.
• D632 Social transfers in kind- purchased market production: individual goods and services in the
form of reimbursements by social security funds of approved expenditures made by households on
specific goods and services; or provided directly to the beneficiaries by market producers from which
general government purchases the corresponding goods and services.
• D7 Other current transfers: include net non-life insurance premiums, non-life insurance claims,
Current transfers within general government, Current international cooperation, miscellaneous current
transfers and VAT- and GNI-based EU own resources.
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• D8 Adjustment for the change in pension entitlements: the adjustment for the change in pension
entitlements (D.8) represents the adjustment needed to make appear in the savings of households the
change in the pension entitlements on which households have a definite claim. The pension entitlement
change comes from contributions and benefits recorded in the secondary distribution of income account.
• D9 Capital transfers, payable: capital transfers require the acquisition or disposal of an asset, or
assets, by at least one of the parties to the transaction. Whether made in cash or in kind, they result in
a commensurate change in the financial, or non-financial, assets shown in the balance sheets of one or
both parties to the transaction.
• NP Acquisitions less disposals of non-produced assets: non-produced assets consist of assets that
have not been produced within the production boundary, and that may be used in the production of
goods and services. This includes acquisitions of natural resources, contracts/leases/licenses, goodwill
and marketing assets.
Appendix IV: Methodology for estimating individual Bayesian VAR mod-
els by country
The time-series Bayesian VAR approach used on the paper is based on independent normal-Wishart priors
with Gibbs sampling, from which we derive orthogonalized impulse response functions and the corresponding
variance decomposition. The independent normal-Wishart priors set for β and Σ (respectively the vector of
parameters and the residual variance-covariance matrix) are
β ∼ N (β0, V0)
Σ ∼ IW (S0, α0)
β0 is a vector of nearly all zeros except the diagonal elements corresponding to coefficients of a variable's
first own lag (hyper-parameter µ1) that can be set to a different value, usually 1 for a random walk or less
for a AR(1) process. In the present case, we set the prior means to zero. For V0, we use the following
hyperparameters λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0.5 , λ3 = 1 and λ4 = 100 , common in the literature. The residual standard
deviations of the variables are calculated based on an unrestricted least square estimate. Conditional posterior


























S̄ = S0 + E
′E
ᾱ = α0 + T
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where S−10 = λ1I , V0
−1 = λ2I , and α0 = λ3. With the residual matrix E = Y −XB for β = vec (B),
y = vec (Y ) and X the regressors matrix. The scale matrix S̄ and the degrees of freedom ᾱ are calculated
based on prior error variance of endogenous variables S018 and prior degrees of freedom of the error-term
α0. We set the scale to be equal to 0.00001 and the prior degrees of freedom to be equal to 10 (number of
endogenous variables). Based on an initial estimate of Σ, a Gibb’s sampler is used to obtain properties of the
unconditional posteriors with 10000 iterations and 200 burn-in draws. As a robustness check, we also estimate
the same model using the Litterman-Minnesota prior based on hyper-parameters λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0.99 , λ3 = 1
and determination of the residual variance-covariance matrix from univariate autoregressive estimates.
18Following Karlsson (2012), S0 can be set to be the diagonal variance covariance matrix obtained from
individual AR regressions.
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Appendix V: Orthogonalized impulse response functions by country
I. Response of the CA to a shock to Compensation of employees
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II. Response of the CA to a shock to Intermediate Consumption
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III. Response of the CA to a shock to Social Benefits
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IV. Response of the CA to a shock to Subsidies
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V. Response of the CA to a shock to Property Income
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